Ukraine’s privatisation agenda is returning to the centre of economic policy, but its meaning now goes beyond the sale of individual assets. It is an attempt to reduce the state’s oversized role in key sectors and bring private capital back into areas where the war has disrupted normal investment cycles.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development supports Ukraine’s plans to sell stakes in banks and other nationalised assets. For Kyiv, this matters not only as a political endorsement: the bank could help finance future buyers if the structure of the deals and the quality of investors meet its standards.
The government expects to raise about 13 billion hryvnias from privatisation this year. Against the scale of defence spending, energy repairs and reconstruction needs, this will not transform the budget. Yet it sends a different message: the state is preparing to step back, gradually, from the role of excessive owner.
According to Daycom’s earlier analysis, Ukraine’s central challenge is not simply selling assets, but securing credible buyers and trusted rules. Wartime privatisation can work only when investors see more than a short political campaign — they need a stable framework of ownership, legal protection and corporate governance.
The most sensitive area is the banking sector. The state controls more than half of the market, a position shaped by wartime risks, previous financial crises and the nationalisation of individual institutions. This model helped preserve stability in a critical period, but over time it limits competition and financial development.
Among the assets for which Kyiv is seeking buyers are Sense Bank and Ukrgasbank. Both are significant institutions, which means their sale cannot be treated as a simple fiscal operation. It will test Ukraine’s ability to attract strategic capital into finance without weakening banking-sector resilience.
The EBRD’s role carries particular weight. It does not replace private investors or absorb the state’s political risk. But its readiness to finance future transactions could lower the entry barrier for buyers who see Ukraine as a market with high potential and equally high wartime risk.
Bank privatisation is also tied to a wider reform of Ukraine’s capital market. The EBRD is working with the National Bank of Ukraine, the securities regulator and the Finance Ministry on modernising market infrastructure. The aim is to create a vertically integrated exchange with clearing and depository functions.
For Ukraine, this is not a technical adjustment. It is an attempt to build the foundation of a domestic investment market. Without a liquid exchange, transparent ownership records and efficient clearing, privatisation remains a sequence of isolated deals. With modern infrastructure, it can become part of a longer financial cycle.
Another priority is port infrastructure. A tender for the concession of two terminals at Chornomorsk has already drawn notable investor interest. The 40-year concession model would allow a private operator to manage and modernise the facilities while the state retains strategic ownership of the asset.
Chornomorsk has particular importance for Ukraine’s wartime economy. Odesa region’s ports have become critical for exports, logistics and foreign-currency inflows, while remaining targets for Russian strikes on Black Sea infrastructure. The concession is therefore not just a business project, but a test of investment endurance.
The EBRD and IFC are helping the government structure the concession and oversee the tender process. In such deals, the price is only part of the equation. The investor must be able to manage risk, fund modernisation, ensure transparent governance and avoid turning a strategic asset into a source of political conflict.
At the same time, the bank is supporting Ukraine’s energy sector, which remains one of the central fronts of economic resilience. After repeated Russian attacks on power infrastructure, Ukraine needs more than emergency repairs. It needs a system that is more decentralised, protected and flexible.
The EBRD’s pipeline includes renewable-energy projects with a capacity of about 700 megawatts. For a country under constant pressure on generation and grids, this marks a gradual shift from survival to reconstruction. Solar power, wind projects and distributed generation are becoming elements of national security.
Another part of the support focuses on protecting transformers. Of about 135 key energy installations across the country, roughly 118 are expected to receive protective shelters by the end of the year. It is a pragmatic response to wartime reality: power infrastructure can no longer be designed as if the threat of strikes were temporary.
Taken together, these tracks form a new economic frame. Privatisation, concessions, stock-market reform, port modernisation and energy protection no longer stand apart. They amount to an attempt to restore Ukraine’s investment agency before the war is over.
The risks remain substantial. Military threats, courts, political competition over assets, valuation disputes and investment insurance could all narrow the pool of buyers. That is why the involvement of international financial institutions matters: it does not guarantee success, but it raises the standards of the process.
For the government, this year’s privatisation will be a test of discipline. Selling assets quickly is easier than selling them well. Ukraine needs more than one-off budget revenue; it needs investors who bring capital, management standards, technology and a long-term presence in the market.
The EBRD’s support shows that the window for such transactions has not closed, even during the war. But it will not widen automatically. Its size will depend on transparent tenders, strong legislation, capital-market reform and the state’s readiness to give up control where competition should work.
