The mass strike on Kyiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities was meant to look like a display of force. Hundreds of drones, dozens of missiles, smoke over the capital, destroyed homes and dead civilians were meant to show Ukraine and the West that Russia can still raise the stakes.
But behind that show of power, another reality is becoming clearer: the Kremlin is striking harder because it is losing momentum on the ground. Russia’s advance has slowed, casualties are rising, mobilization requires increasingly coercive methods, and the negotiation track has effectively stalled.
In this logic, aerial terror is not a substitute for the front line, but an attempt to compensate for its limits. When the army cannot quickly seize Donbas, break Ukrainian defenses or impose favorable terms on Kyiv, it shifts pressure onto cities, energy systems, civilian infrastructure and public endurance.
According to Daycom’s assessment, Russia’s current escalation is less a sign of confidence than of a nervous need to change the arithmetic of future talks. Moscow is trying to prove that even without rapid battlefield success, it can make the price of Ukrainian resistance unbearable.
That is why strikes on Kyiv carry political meaning. The capital is not only an administrative center. It is the symbol of state control, the place where government, diplomacy, media, foreign missions and military planning operate. A strike on Kyiv is always an attempt to hit the feeling that Ukraine remains in command of the situation.
Dnipro, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and the Poltava region matter in a different way. They are industrial, logistical, energy and frontline-linked hubs. They sustain not only civilian life in the rear, but also the resilience of the front. Russia strikes them to stretch Ukrainian defenses, force interceptor use and raise the social cost of war.
Yet this tactic does not erase the central fact: the Russian army is finding it harder to turn manpower and material resources into real territorial gains. Even more attacks do not guarantee movement. In some sectors, Russian assaults have degraded into actions by tiny groups, sometimes only one or two soldiers.
Ukraine’s defense has grown stronger over the past year. Drones, artillery coordination, strikes on logistics, better front-line management and European aid have shifted the balance. Ukraine is not merely holding; in some areas, it is regaining initiative and forcing Russia to spend more lives for smaller results.
Russian losses have become one of Moscow’s main sources of anxiety. Western estimates point to hundreds of thousands of killed and wounded since the start of the full-scale invasion. Exact figures vary, but the trend is clear: the Kremlin is paying for the war at a rate that is becoming harder to offset through ordinary recruitment.
That is why Moscow is intensifying forced mobilization in the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. Canceled deferrals, mandatory registration, raids and threats of punishment all show that Russia is trying to fill personnel gaps not only with its own citizens, but also with people from occupied Ukrainian territories.
This has a double effect. On one level, the Kremlin gains additional manpower. On another, it changes the demographic and social structure of occupied regions by pushing Ukrainian men into service for the aggressor state. Mobilization there becomes not only a military instrument, but a political one.
Putin’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from Donbas remains a maximalist condition, but it is increasingly difficult to support with facts on the battlefield. Russia claims territory it cannot quickly take in full. This gap between political ambition and military capacity is pushing the Kremlin toward harsher strikes on the rear.
The air campaign is meant to restore what Russia is losing on the ground: fear, tempo and negotiating weight. If Ukraine begins to look stronger than it did a year ago, Moscow tries to alter the picture through urban destruction. If the West begins to see a chance for Kyiv to fight toward a more favorable cease-fire, the Kremlin wants to show that every month of support will carry a new cost.
The United States is part of this calculation. Washington’s attention is divided between Ukraine, Iran and wider crises in the Middle East. Russia is trying to use that moment: strike harder while the U.S. is less focused on the Ukrainian track, while still keeping channels open for future bargaining.
The Kremlin has not fully closed the door to negotiations. It says it is ready to talk, but at the same time demands concessions Ukraine cannot accept without effectively admitting defeat. That is not a peace offer. It is an attempt to force Ukraine into talks under fire.
Zelensky, by contrast, is trying to use the moment to strengthen Ukraine’s position. His calls for additional Patriot systems, interceptors and European anti-ballistic defense follow a clear logic: if Russia cannot quickly win on the ground, it must not be allowed to break Ukraine from the air.
European support is also changing the balance. New weapons packages, decisions on fighter jets, investment in defense production and political alignment with Kyiv give Ukraine resources for longer resilience. This is not instant victory, but it undermines Russia’s expectation that the West will simply tire.
Still, underestimating Russia would be dangerous. Its front-line tempo may be weakening, but its ability to escalate remains. It still has missiles, drones, a mobilization apparatus, oil revenue and a political willingness to sacrifice people. Kremlin weakness does not make Russia less dangerous. Often, it makes it more aggressive.
That is the paradox of the current phase of the war. Russia is showing signs of exhaustion, but answering them with stronger strikes. It is losing maneuver on the ground, but trying to regain it in the sky. It speaks of negotiations, but prepares the ground for them with ruins, deaths and night sirens.
For Ukraine, the central task is not to lose initiative. That means holding the front, expanding drone and long-range strike campaigns, hitting Russian logistics, protecting cities and preventing Moscow from turning terror into an argument at the negotiating table.
Russia is not striking today because it is confidently winning. It is striking because it wants to conceal its loss of momentum and make everyone else believe its strength is still unlimited. The real picture is more complex: the Kremlin remains dangerous, but it is no longer all-powerful. The next phase of the war will be decided between those two realities.
