Russia is beginning large-scale nuclear drills involving missile forces, the Northern and Pacific fleets, long-range aviation and units from two military districts. In scale, this is not a routine check, but a display of the full vertical of nuclear deterrence.
The drills involve about 64,000 personnel and 7,800 pieces of equipment. They include launches of ballistic and cruise missiles, more than 200 missile launchers, 140 aircraft, 73 surface ships and 13 submarines, including eight strategic nuclear submarines.
According to Daycom’s assessment, the main purpose of these maneuvers is not preparation for the immediate use of nuclear weapons, but a forced reminder of the price of escalation. The Kremlin is trying to speak to the West in the language of risk precisely when its conventional war against Ukraine is becoming more costly.
The participation of forces linked to Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus gives the exercises additional weight. It moves the signal from Russia’s internal military theater into the immediate space of NATO’s eastern flank.
The official formula — preparing and using nuclear forces in the event of aggression — sounds defensive. But in Russia’s political language, such wording has long served a double purpose. It explains the maneuvers to the domestic audience while warning external opponents.
Moscow is demonstrating that its nuclear triad remains functional: land-based missiles, strategic submarines and long-range aviation. This is the core of Russia’s status as a major military power, even as its ground forces are worn down by the war in Ukraine.
The role of the Northern and Pacific fleets is especially telling. Russia is underlining the global reach of its nuclear potential: the threat is not confined to the European theater, but extends from the Arctic to the Pacific.
For Ukraine, these exercises are part of a familiar pressure strategy. When Moscow faces problems at the front, strikes on its oil refineries, a slowing offensive and stronger Western support for Kyiv, it reaches more often for the nuclear argument.
That argument is aimed less at Ukrainian decisions than at the capitals of Ukraine’s partners. The Kremlin wants every discussion about missiles, air defense, long-range strikes or new sanctions to take place under the shadow of one question: what if Russia goes further?
This is nuclear blackmail in its modern form. It does not always require a direct threat. Large drills, missile launches, references to Belarus, strategic submarines and tactical weapons are enough to raise the political temperature in Europe.
The Belarusian element sharpens the signal. The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons there has already changed the security map of the region. Their inclusion in the exercise scenario reminds Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and the wider NATO alliance that Moscow wants nuclear pressure closer to the Alliance’s borders.
At the same time, the practical meaning of the drills should not be exaggerated. Nuclear exercises are part of the regular military culture of major powers. The United States, China, France and Britain also test their deterrence forces. Russia’s difference lies in holding such demonstrations during an active war of aggression.
Context changes the meaning. When a state that invaded its neighbor rehearses the large-scale use of nuclear forces while describing itself as a potential victim of aggression, the exercise becomes not only a defensive procedure, but part of a political operation.
The West’s answer must be cold. Panic helps the Kremlin. Ignoring the signal is also dangerous. What is needed is a combination of restraint, intelligence work, NATO readiness and continued support for Ukraine without visible fear of Russian rhetoric.
The Kremlin is counting on nuclear language to exhaust societies faster than ordinary front-line news. It appeals to the deepest fears: survival, global war, uncontrolled escalation. That is why Moscow repeats the tactic even without moving toward actual use.
But overuse of the nuclear signal has its own reverse effect. The more often Russia displays nuclear readiness as a political instrument, the more the West learns to separate real risk from information pressure. Blackmail repeated too often gradually loses part of its psychological force.
Still, the risk does not disappear. In a war where drones already enter NATO airspace, strikes reach Russian refineries and Belarus has become a military platform for Moscow, any nuclear drill adds pressure to a system already operating close to its limits.
Russia wants the world to see it not only as an army being exhausted in Ukraine, but as a nuclear power able to raise the stakes. That is the central message of the drills. They are meant to cover the weakness of the conventional war with the force of strategic fear.
Yet this also reveals the limits of Russia’s strategy. When a state must keep reminding others of its nuclear arsenal, it means its other tools of persuasion are working less effectively. Economic pressure has not broken Ukraine. Missile terror has not stopped resistance. The front-line offensive has not produced a quick result.
These drills should therefore be read as part of a larger war of nerves. Moscow is testing not only missiles, ships and aircraft. It is testing Western endurance, Ukraine’s will to continue fighting and Europe’s ability to live beside a state that has turned nuclear deterrence into a tool of everyday politics.
