Ukraine is bringing privatization back to the center of its wartime economic policy. The government plans to raise about 13 billion hryvnias, or roughly $295 million, this year by selling state assets to private investors.
In a peacetime economy, that sum would not look transformative. For a country living through more than four years of war, it carries a different meaning. It is not only a source of budget revenue, but also a test of private capital’s confidence in Ukraine under conditions of constant attacks, limited resources and urgent reconstruction needs.
Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has called the target ambitious for wartime. The government expects almost 10 billion hryvnias from large-scale privatizations and another 3 billion from the sale of smaller assets.
According to Daycom’s earlier analysis, this privatization drive has a double purpose. It is meant to bring money into the budget while also clearing the economy of assets that have remained inefficiently in state hands or are tied to Russian capital.
The most visible asset is Kyiv’s Ocean Plaza shopping mall. Before the war, it was one of the capital’s best-known commercial properties. Because of its links to Russian oligarchic capital, it was confiscated by the state. It is now being prepared for auction in the third quarter.
Ocean Plaza’s estimated value is close to $100 million. That makes it more than a shopping center. It has become a symbol of a broader process: Ukraine is trying to turn confiscated Russian-linked assets from political trophies into financial resources for the wartime economy.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Kyiv has tightened sanctions against Moscow, opened court cases involving property held by the Russian state and business figures close to the Kremlin, and gradually moved such assets into Ukraine’s budgetary logic.
That is an important shift. Confiscation alone does not create value if an asset remains trapped in legal and managerial uncertainty. Value emerges when property receives a clear status, a new owner, investment, tax flows and jobs.
Privatization during war is always harder than in peacetime. Investors assess not only the price of an asset, but also the risk of missile strikes, insurance, legal clarity, regulatory stability, access to financing and the long-term outlook for the Ukrainian market.
That is why the government’s 13 billion hryvnia target is both financial and reputational. If major assets find buyers, it will signal that private capital is prepared to enter Ukraine not only after the war, but while the war is still underway.
Small-scale privatization has already shown movement. Since the start of the year, the state has received more than 1 billion hryvnias from the sale of smaller assets. That does not solve Ukraine’s budget problems, but it shows that demand exists even under deep uncertainty.
For Ukraine’s budget, these revenues will not replace international aid, taxes or domestic borrowing. But they can reduce pressure on public finances, provide money for recovery and show partners that the state is looking for internal sources of resilience.
There is also a political dimension. Selling assets linked to Russian capital allows Ukraine to speak not only about sanctions, but about the economic responsibility of the aggressor. Property that once operated inside Ukrainian jurisdiction should now work for Ukrainian reconstruction.
The risks remain significant. The worst outcome would be privatization at depressed prices because of war, weak competition or legal constraints. In that case, the state could lose more than it gains.
That is why transparent auctions, clear rules, competitive investor access and protection from political influence will be essential. Wartime cannot become an excuse for opaque sales, because trust in state decisions is especially valuable now.
Ocean Plaza will be a test case. If the sale is handled properly, it could set a precedent for other confiscated and state-owned assets. If the process becomes stuck in disputes or mistrust, it will deepen skepticism toward the entire privatization program.
Ukraine needs more than one-time revenue. It needs a new type of owner — one capable of investing, maintaining assets, paying taxes and operating in an economy that is fighting and rebuilding at the same time. That is what separates development-oriented privatization from a simple sell-off to fill a budget gap.
In 2026, privatization will become one measure of whether Ukraine’s economy can move from survival toward active renewal. War narrows horizons, but it does not eliminate the need for efficient ownership, capital and reconstruction.
Ukraine is selling assets not out of weakness, but out of the need to make the economy move where the state can no longer afford to carry dead weight. In that sense, $295 million is only the surface figure. The deeper question is whether the country can turn wartime confiscation and state property into a resource for future growth.
