After Xi’s talks with Vladimir Putin, such a document appeared. It became the political frame of the visit: China and Russia did not merely record their bilateral closeness, but tried to describe the global situation in their own language — as a crisis of order, fragmentation of the international community and the risk of a return to the “law of the jungle.”
That contrast matters more than protocol. In Trump’s case, Beijing kept its distance: the two sides spoke to each other, but did not arrive at a common formula. In Putin’s case, China agreed to a text in which Moscow and Beijing appeared as a single political voice against unilateral dominance.
According to Daycom’s earlier analysis, documents of this kind reveal the real level of trust more clearly than a banquet, a garden walk or a formal signing ceremony. A joint declaration means the two sides are ready not only to trade and coordinate, but also to publicly share part of the same ideological burden.
The phrase “law of the jungle” sounds like a universal warning, but its target is easy to read. China and Russia did not name specific states in that passage, yet they described the very order they have long associated with Western dominance, sanctions, military alliances and pressure on sovereign regimes.
For Moscow, this is a politically useful construction. It allows Russia to present its confrontation with the West not as a consequence of the war against Ukraine, but as part of a wider struggle against an unequal global order. For Beijing, it is also convenient: China can criticize American influence without moving into openly confrontational language.
Yet the strength of the statement has limits. It creates political atmosphere, but it does not answer the central question: how far China is prepared to turn the rhetoric of partnership into economic commitments that would materially change Russia’s position.
This is where gas becomes decisive. The Kremlin said an important energy understanding had been reached, but gave no details. Separately, it made clear that there was a general understanding on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, while key parameters still had to be agreed and no clear timetable existed.
That caution is revealing. For Russia, Power of Siberia 2 has long ceased to be merely an infrastructure project. It is an attempt to replace the lost European gas market with a Chinese route. For China, it may be a useful resource corridor, but it is not a political gift to Moscow.
Beijing can bargain hard because it can afford to. It has alternative energy sources, a stronger negotiating position and a clear understanding that, after the rupture with Europe, Russia needs a new major buyer far more urgently than China needs this particular Russian gas.
The absence of concrete timing for the pipeline therefore weighs almost as heavily as the joint declaration itself. In the political text, Moscow and Beijing speak almost in unison. In the energy details, the asymmetry returns: Russia is in a hurry; China is calculating.
It was also telling that Xi and Putin did not take questions after the ceremony. That left room only for prepared formulas: strategic coordination, opposition to “unilateral bullying,” cooperation in artificial intelligence and technological innovation, settlements in rubles and yuan, and Russia’s readiness to keep supplying China with energy.
The format strengthened control over the image, but it also underlined what remained unanswered. There was no clarity on gas prices, construction timelines, future volumes or how far China is willing to go in providing economic support to Russia under sanctions.
The twenty documents signed in the presence of the two leaders, along with roughly the same number announced separately, created the impression of a broad breakthrough. But in such packages, quantity does not always equal strategic weight. The real value lies not in memoranda, but in agreements that change the flows of money, energy and technology.
That is why the comparison with Trump’s visit returns from another angle. The United States and China had no joint statement because there is too much open competition between them. Russia and China had one because both sides benefit from a shared language against the Western-led order. But language is not the same as full economic integration.
Beijing gave Moscow a symbolically strong document and a powerful political stage. In the most practical question, however — the large gas route — China kept time, price and the final decision in its own hands. That is the core meaning of the Beijing meeting: Russia received a declaration of partnership, while China preserved the negotiating advantage.
