Xi Jinping’s trip to Pyongyang looks like a show of unity among authoritarian allies. Beneath the protocol, however, lies unease. China’s leader is traveling not only to embrace Kim Jong-un, but to restore his own weight in a relationship where North Korea has suddenly found an alternative.
Seven years ago, Kim was far weaker. Sanctions were squeezing his economy, talks with the United States had collapsed, and the pandemic had sealed the country off almost completely. North Korea depended on China as its main source of trade, foreign currency, fuel and political cover.
Now Pyongyang speaks to Beijing from a different position. Its alliance with Russia has brought Kim oil, food, money, technology and a renewed sense of strategic importance. In return, Moscow has received ammunition, weapons and soldiers for its war against Ukraine.
According to Daycom’s assessment, this is what changes the meaning of Xi’s visit. China is no longer simply receiving loyalty from a junior partner. It must court a dictator who has learned to balance between two powerful neighbors and extract benefits from both.
For Beijing, North Korea has always been a difficult asset. It creates tension on the Korean Peninsula, provokes the United States, South Korea and Japan, advances its nuclear program, and yet remains a buffer between China and America’s allies.
The problem is that this buffer has become less manageable. Kim no longer looks like an isolated client who needs China’s permission to breathe. Russia’s war has given him a new market, new military value and a new channel for technological support.
Moscow has effectively restored Pyongyang’s Cold War-era geopolitical role. North Korea can once again trade on its strategic usefulness: to Russia in the war against Ukraine, to China in confrontation with the United States, and to itself in the pursuit of nuclear-state status.
That is why Xi must show that China has not lost leverage. Beijing has restored rail and air links with Pyongyang and can support tourism, trade and the border economy. But the very fact of Xi’s trip says something important: automatic obedience can no longer be assumed.
Kim is likely to use the meeting for bargaining. He needs Chinese tourists, goods, investment, food, energy and political recognition. Tourism matters especially because it is less tightly restricted by sanctions and can bring in foreign currency without directly violating the central bans.
The North Korean leader has already invested in seaside resorts, coastal projects and mountain hot springs, clearly counting first on visitors from China. For a country whose industry and banking system are constrained by sanctions, even controlled tourism becomes part of survival.
Xi has a different objective. He needs to show the world that China remains the center of authoritarian diplomacy. Against the backdrop of the U.S. war with Iran, trade conflicts and Washington’s tensions with allies, Beijing wants to present itself as a force of order and stability.
But displaying unity with Kim carries a cost. The closer Beijing stands to Pyongyang, the harder it becomes to persuade Europe, South Korea or Japan that China is a responsible stabilizer. China cannot call itself a force for order while overlooking a regime expanding its nuclear arsenal.
The nuclear question hangs over the summit with particular weight. North Korea already possesses dozens of warheads and is still seeking advanced intercontinental missiles capable of delivering them over long distances. For Kim, this is not a bargaining chip. It is the regime’s survival guarantee.
After U.S. strikes on Iran, that logic has hardened further in Pyongyang. If Washington justifies military force as necessary to stop another state’s nuclear ambitions, Kim draws the opposite conclusion: only an existing nuclear arsenal can protect him from a similar scenario.
For years, China and Russia at least formally shared the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Now Moscow has effectively legitimized Pyongyang’s right to strengthen its defenses, while Beijing has shifted cautiously from a rigid denuclearization formula toward a looser language of stability.
That is a dangerous evolution. If China decides that a nuclear-armed North Korea is a useful lever against the United States, South Korea and Japan, the regional balance will become less predictable. In Seoul and Tokyo, that would only intensify debates about their own nuclear options.
The United States is also in a difficult position. Donald Trump wants to return to personal diplomacy with Kim, but Pyongyang is no longer the same as it was during their first summits. Kim now has Russia behind him, less dependence on China and even fewer reasons to put his nuclear program on the table.
Xi could deliver a message from Washington or try to nudge Pyongyang toward cautious dialogue. But his own interest is limited. China will not want to pressure Kim so hard that it pushes him closer to Moscow or risks instability along its border.
In this triangle, each leader is playing his own game. Kim wants money, technology and recognition without nuclear concessions. Putin wants weapons and soldiers for his war. Xi wants control over Pyongyang and the image of a great power without which Asian crises cannot be resolved.
The worst scenario for the region is Kim’s successful balancing act. If he can receive military technology from Russia, economic benefits from China and attention from the United States without concessions, his regime will become bolder and less constrained.
North Korea would then do more than survive sanctions. It would turn its isolation into diplomatic currency. The more great powers compete for influence over Pyongyang, the less pressure Kim will feel to stop missile tests, nuclear production or military provocations.
Xi’s trip to North Korea is therefore not a friendly ritual, but an attempt to restore hierarchy. China wants to remind Kim that Russia may be useful, but Beijing remains the neighbor, market, border and long-term insurance policy of his regime.
Kim, however, has already seen that dependence can be diluted. That is what makes the Pyongyang summit important. China’s leader is visiting an ally that has become less obedient. North Korea’s dictator will receive a patron who now has to persuade, not simply command.
