European Council President António Costa’s attempt to open a diplomatic channel with the Kremlin did not mark the start of a new peace process. It became a mirror of Europe’s uncertainty. After years of isolating Moscow, Brussels suddenly saw that even a brief contact with Russia could divide allies.
This was not a full negotiation and not a discussion of peace terms. Costa’s office, through a senior aide, made brief contacts with the Kremlin to open a communication channel. But the very existence of such a channel proved politically heavier than its content.
Since 2022, the EU has built its Russia policy around diplomatic and economic isolation. That isolation was meant to show that aggression against Ukraine could not be normalized. Now, as the war shows no sign of ending quickly, some European capitals are asking how to speak to Moscow without rewarding it for aggression.
According to Daycom’s assessment, Costa’s initiative exposed Europe’s central problem: it wants to regain a role in any future peace settlement, but it has no agreed answer on who can represent the continent, where the mandate begins and ends, and what counts as useful contact rather than a political gift to the Kremlin.
At the Brussels summit, some leaders saw Costa’s move as insufficiently coordinated. The greatest concern came from Nordic and Baltic countries, for whom any softening of the diplomatic regime toward Moscow without a change in Russian behavior looks like a dangerous signal.
Their skepticism is not a formal anti-Russian reflex. It is rooted in proximity to Russia and in experience with its tactics. Moscow can use even minimal contact as evidence that isolation is weakening and that Europe is growing tired of the Ukrainian war.
Germany and France also showed little enthusiasm. For Berlin and Paris, the issue is not only the contact itself, but control over the process. If talks with Russia ever begin seriously, they will not be about protocol. They will concern military capabilities, security guarantees for Ukraine and the future of European defense.
Emmanuel Macron drew that line most clearly: Costa may have a role, but he cannot represent EU states when security guarantees are at stake. That is the key qualification. Peace talks will not be a technical matter for institutions. They will be a discussion about armies, weapons, borders, deterrence and Europe’s long-term place in Ukraine’s security.
Friedrich Merz pointed to the E3 format — France, Germany and Britain — with which Volodymyr Zelensky has already agreed key points for possible talks with Moscow. But that trio also creates tension: not all European leaders are ready to accept that the continental position should be shaped without them.
Italy has long argued that the EU needs a single representative for contacts with Russia. There is logic in that view: the Kremlin has traditionally exploited differences between European capitals. But a single envoy will not solve the problem if there is no single political mandate beneath that role.
Costa himself defended the move as a necessity. His argument is simple: Europe cannot depend only on others to interpret Russian signals and must be able to convey its own messages to Moscow. In that logic, a communication channel is not a concession, but an instrument of EU sovereignty.
There is support for that position. Ireland and Spain consider the opening of a diplomatic channel justified. For them, silence between Brussels and Moscow cannot be an eternal strategy, especially if the EU claims to be a security actor and not merely Ukraine’s financial donor.
But the question is not whether Europe should ever speak to Russia. The question is whether it can do so without weakness. Contact may be useful for sending signals, preventing escalation, managing nuclear safety or dealing with humanitarian issues. It becomes dangerous, however, if Russia receives dialogue without changing its own behavior.
This is where the eastern flank remains most firm. Latvia stresses that diplomatic channels have little meaning if Russia does not want diplomacy. That is not a rejection of peace. It is a reminder that peace talks begin not with a phone call, but with the aggressor’s readiness to stop the war.
The Netherlands is also calling for caution. Before choosing a negotiator, Europe must understand what will ultimately be on the table. This is not only about a ceasefire. It is about territory, guarantees, sanctions, reconstruction, Ukraine’s army, Russian assets and how to prevent another war after a pause.
For Ukraine, this debate has direct consequences. Kyiv does not want possible EU contacts with Moscow to become a process in which Ukraine’s future is discussed without Ukraine. That is why Zelensky is simultaneously pushing EU accession and Ukraine’s anchoring in Western structures as the answer to Russia’s attempt at diktat.
Europe’s problem is made more complicated by the fact that peace diplomacy has so far been led largely by the United States. The EU funds Ukraine, supplies weapons, adopts sanctions, receives refugees and speaks about security guarantees, but risks remaining on the margins of negotiations if it fails to build its own architecture of participation.
That is what Costa is trying to change. His move can be read as an attempt to bring Brussels back to the center of future diplomacy. But the form of the attempt showed that ambition has run ahead of agreement. Europe wants to be at the table, but has not yet agreed what its chair should look like.
For the Kremlin, this lack of coordination is a resource. Moscow carefully watches for any sign of European fatigue, competition between formats and disputes over representation. If Russia sees the EU entering contact without a unified mandate, it will try to turn that channel into an instrument of division.
That is why sequencing must remain the main safeguard. First must come support for Ukraine, sanctions, military financing, the confiscation of Russian assets, air defense, ammunition and EU accession talks. Only on that basis can contact with Moscow make sense as an additional instrument, not as a substitute for pressure.
If that order is broken, Europe risks repeating an old mistake: mistaking the fact of conversation for evidence of progress. Russia has repeatedly shown that it can talk about peace while preparing new strikes. For Ukraine, diplomacy without strength would not be an opportunity, but a threat.
Costa’s initiative neither failed nor became a breakthrough. It performed a different function: it revealed the true condition of the EU before a possible negotiating phase. The union has resources, influence and institutions, but it still lacks one voice on how to speak to an aggressor without weakening the victim of aggression.
As long as Russia shows no readiness for real peace, Europe’s main message must be not hurried contact, but strength and unity. A channel to the Kremlin may be necessary. But it will make sense only if Moscow hears through it not European confusion, but a clear position: no conversation can replace responsibility for the war against Ukraine.
