The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is again at the center of nuclear anxiety. Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev has claimed that the situation around the facility is approaching a “point of no return” because of increased Ukrainian attacks in the area.
The Russian-installed management at the plant says Ukrainian forces have attacked the facility for three consecutive days. The latest incident, according to that account, caused no injuries or damage to critical infrastructure, and the plant continues to operate normally.
According to Daycom’s assessment, the main danger lies not only in specific strikes or competing accusations. The plant has become a hostage of war, where any incident involving reactors, storage facilities, workshops or power lines is immediately turned into a political weapon.
Zaporizhzhia, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, has been under Russian control since the first weeks of the full-scale invasion. It no longer generates electricity, but it still requires constant power and technical oversight to keep nuclear fuel cooled.
Likhachev said about 2,600 metric tons of nuclear fuel remain at the site. That detail matters: shut-down reactors do not mean the absence of risk. Fuel must be cooled, systems must function, and external power must remain stable.
That is why Zaporizhzhia is not merely an industrial facility. It is a nuclear node where a technical failure, loss of power, fire, damage to auxiliary infrastructure or panic among personnel could have consequences far beyond Enerhodar.
Russia speaks of danger to Eastern Europe and calls for de-escalation. But that rhetoric has an obvious weakness: Russia seized the plant, placed it under military control and created the conditions in which civilian nuclear infrastructure became exposed to the risks of war.
This does not remove the need to avoid any action that could threaten nuclear safety. But the situation around the plant cannot be understood without the central fact of occupation. The facility became dangerous not simply because it stands near a front line, but because it was forcibly pulled into the logic of war.
Permanent monitors from the International Atomic Energy Agency remain one of the few safeguards. Russian-installed officials showed them damage after an earlier incident, which they said hit a transport workshop. But the presence of international monitors does not mean control over the situation.
The IAEA can record, warn, request access and describe risks. It cannot demilitarize the area on its own, restore Ukrainian management of the plant or force the removal of military danger from a nuclear site.
That is the structural problem at Zaporizhzhia. A nuclear power plant requires civilian logic: stability, procedures, technical discipline and transparent management. Around it, however, operates the logic of war: suspicion, drones, artillery, information warfare and coercion.
The phrase “point of no return” is especially dangerous because it works through fear. It creates the impression that catastrophe is almost inevitable, while allowing Moscow to pressure Europe: unless the West restrains Kyiv, the risk will grow.
This is a familiar mechanism of Russian nuclear politics. First, a dangerous situation is created. Then responsibility is blurred. Then warnings of catastrophe follow. Finally, the West is urged to show “restraint,” often without naming the original cause.
For Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia plant remains part of its sovereign energy infrastructure. For Russia, it is a lever of control, a military asset and a source of political pressure. For Europe, it is a constant reminder that nuclear safety cannot be separated from occupation.
The greatest risk now is the normalization of the fact that Europe’s largest nuclear plant has spent years under the control of the army of an aggressor state. The longer this continues, the more the world grows used to an abnormal situation.
In the short term, maximum technical caution is essential: secure external power, access for personnel, functioning cooling systems, full IAEA access and transparent reporting of all incidents. But that is only the minimum level of catastrophe prevention.
In the longer term, no formula for de-escalation will be complete without demilitarizing the plant and returning it to normal civilian management. A nuclear power plant cannot be a shield, a warehouse or an instrument of diplomatic blackmail.
Zaporizhzhia again shows how Russia’s war against Ukraine turns technical facilities into zones of strategic fear. As long as the plant remains occupied, every new warning about a “point of no return” will be more than a warning. It will be a reminder that the real point of danger was crossed when an army seized a nuclear site.
