The deal between the United States and Iran has not yet entered its main negotiating phase, but Tehran has already begun an internal struggle over who will be responsible for its consequences. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, has made clear that he allowed the agreement, but does not want to become its political owner.
His first public reaction after the agreement was signed was carefully structured as an act of distance. He acknowledged that he had assented to President Masoud Pezeshkian’s move, but stressed that he did not agree with signing it as a matter of principle. In Iran’s system of power, that distinction is not minor rhetoric. It defines the boundaries of future maneuver.
Khamenei effectively shifted responsibility for the deal onto the elected government. In his framing, the president accepted the obligation to protect the rights of Iranians and the “resistance front” — the political and military network through which Iran has projected influence across the region for decades, including through Hezbollah.
For Daycom, this statement is the key to understanding the next stage of talks: Iran is not entering the process as a side ready for deep normalization. It is entering as a regime that accepted a pause out of tactical necessity while immediately installing ideological safeguards against concessions that could become too painful.
Khamenei’s central phrase concerns the “excessive demands” of the United States. It is vague enough to cover almost any issue in a future agreement: uranium enrichment, nuclear stockpiles, inspections, ballistic missiles, support for regional allies, Hezbollah’s role or the conditions attached to sanctions relief.
That vagueness is precisely the strength of the formula. Iranian diplomats receive permission to talk, but not full freedom to bargain. Any serious compromise can be branded an “excessive demand” by the enemy. Any step back can be blocked by invoking the supreme leader’s red lines.
This is the classic Iranian tactic of dual responsibility. The elected government conducts negotiations, seeks economic relief, speaks to the outside world and absorbs the risk of an unpopular compromise. The supreme leader preserves the right to endorse the result if it proves useful, or distance himself from it if the agreement provokes anger inside the regime.
The same logic shaped Iran’s earlier nuclear diplomacy. Diplomats were allowed to negotiate, but afterward the religious-political center of power criticized implementation, emphasized distrust of the West and showed its domestic audience that concessions did not mean a change of course.
The current situation is even more complicated. Iran has received significant economic benefits from the preliminary arrangement: a path toward oil relief, access to restricted funds, the prospect of unfreezing assets and a political pause after the war. But the hardest questions — the nuclear program, missiles, drones and regional proxies — have been moved to the next stage.
That is why Khamenei is moving quickly to define the limits. He does not want future negotiations to look like the beginning of Iran’s strategic turn. His signal is both internal and external: Tehran is ready to talk to Washington, but not ready to accept Washington’s picture of the world.
His statement that in-person negotiations do not mean accepting the enemy’s view carries particular weight. It is addressed not only to the United States. It is also a message to Iran’s security forces, parliament, conservative circles and hard-liners who may see the deal as a dangerous concession after the war.
After the supreme leader’s statement, Iranian officials quickly began demonstrating loyalty. They thanked Khamenei, spoke about his red lines and reminded audiences that Iran’s hand supposedly remains “on the trigger.” This was not merely an internal ritual. It was a way to fix the negotiating framework before the second round.
For Washington, that position creates a serious problem. The Trump administration is selling the deal as a victory of pressure: the United States struck Iran, reopened Hormuz, lowered oil prices and forced Tehran to the table. Tehran is trying to present the same agreement as proof of its own resilience and of America’s need to negotiate.
Those two versions cannot coexist for long without conflict. If the United States insists on deep restrictions, Iran may call them excessive. If Washington softens its demands for the sake of stability, critics in Israel, the Gulf and Congress will describe the deal as a reward for Tehran.
The nuclear program will be the first test. The United States wants guarantees that Iran cannot quickly approach a nuclear weapon. That means not only a declaration that the program is peaceful, but strict rules on uranium enrichment, inspections, stockpiles and technical infrastructure.
For Iran, this is exactly where the boundary of sovereignty lies. Tehran has spent decades presenting its nuclear program as a national right and concessions as the imposition of foreign will. Even technical formulas can therefore become political explosives. Khamenei has already given his negotiators the language of resistance.
The second knot is the “resistance front.” Its mention in the supreme leader’s statement was not accidental. Iran is not ready to easily abandon the network of allies that gives it influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and around Israel. For Tehran, this is not the periphery of foreign policy. It is a system of strategic depth.
That is why a deal with the United States cannot be stable if it bypasses Iran’s regional instruments. Hezbollah remains a point of tension in Lebanon, Israel does not believe in security without freedom to strike, and Gulf states fear missiles and drones. Khamenei is effectively warning that this network will not be surrendered under pressure.
The third knot is Iran’s internal politics. President Pezeshkian may seek economic breathing room, but his mandate is limited. In Iran’s hybrid system, elected institutions matter, yet the final frame is set by the theocratic center of power. Any deal with the president therefore requires the supreme leader’s tacit approval — and can be narrowed by him at any moment.
This makes negotiations with Iran especially difficult. The United States is not dealing with a single authority, but with a system that speaks in several voices at once. One voice asks for economic relief. A second promises resistance. A third thanks the supreme leader. A fourth threatens retaliation. All of them belong to the same political structure.
For Trump, this is a dangerous moment. He can say Iran agreed because of American strength. But if Iran’s supreme leader publicly says Trump made the deal out of desperation, the contest has already shifted into the realm of symbolic victory. Each side wants to show its own audience that it is the one setting the terms.
That contest can quickly erode trust. If Washington demands too much, Tehran will say the United States has violated the spirit of the arrangement. If Iran refuses key restrictions, Washington will face a choice: return to pressure or preserve the deal at the cost of concessions that look like weakness.
The next talks are therefore unlikely to be a straight road to peace. They are more likely to become a series of tactical bargains. Iran will try to preserve economic benefits without giving up its main levers. The United States will try to turn a temporary pause into a controlled order. Israel and the Gulf states will press to ensure that missiles and regional proxies do not disappear from the agenda.
In that sense, Khamenei’s statement does not destroy the deal immediately. But it places a delayed charge inside it. The supreme leader is allowing the process to continue, while already defining how to explain its failure if compromise becomes too costly for the regime.
The Iran deal now has not only an external deadline, but an internal one. Washington will be watching the 60 days of negotiations. Tehran will be watching whether an economic pause turns into political capitulation in the eyes of its own security establishment and conservatives.
That is why peace with Iran remains fragile. It depends not only on the text of the memorandum, oil prices or the schedule of meetings in Switzerland. It depends on whether the Iranian regime is prepared to limit its own instruments of power. As long as Khamenei speaks in the language of permission without consent, the answer is closer to no.
