European security has received a warning that does not fit easily into old military categories. For 18 months, unidentified drones were detected over air bases, ports, airports and nuclear-related sites. They did not drop bombs, but they did something no less troubling: they mapped NATO’s vulnerabilities.
Researchers at the International Institute for Strategic Studies examined 144 suspicious incidents across more than a dozen countries. Some involved sites linked to nuclear deterrence: RAF Lakenheath in Britain, Île Longue in France, Kleine Brogel in Belgium and Volkel in the Netherlands.
These flights did not look random. Their geography, timing, proximity to Russian shadow fleet vessels and repetition point to a coordinated campaign. Its purpose was not only reconnaissance, but also to test how quickly the West sees a threat, names it and decides to act.
According to Daycom’s earlier analysis, the nuclear dimension makes this story qualitatively different. Russia is not merely testing airports or maritime routes. It is probing the nervous system of deterrence — the sites around which NATO has spent decades building a silent but rigid security architecture.
RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk became one of the most sensitive episodes. The base was being prepared to host U.S. nuclear weapons, and in late 2024 unusual low-flying drones were spotted above it and other U.S. Air Force sites in England. They were neither shot down nor captured, despite incidents lasting long enough to cause serious concern.
France’s Île Longue base in Brittany carries a different significance: it hosts nuclear-powered submarines that form the sea-based component of French nuclear deterrence. The appearance of several drones over such a site cannot be treated as an accidental violation of airspace. It is a direct touch on Europe’s most closed layer of defense.
The incidents over Kleine Brogel and Volkel were no less revealing. Those bases are associated with the presence of U.S. air-launched nuclear weapons in Europe. Even if a drone carries no explosives, its presence above such sites forces militaries to reveal response procedures, patrol routes, radar weaknesses and the limits of political resolve.
The shadow fleet appears to be a central part of this pattern. Vessels with opaque ownership, used by Moscow to evade sanctions, may serve more than an economic function. They can become mobile platforms for drone launches, signal relay, surveillance and withdrawal without leaving an obvious trace.
Such ships can switch off transponders, sail “dark,” appear off the coast of a target country and leave behind an almost unsolvable attribution problem. A drone arrives. An airport or base reacts. The ship disappears or changes course. The evidentiary chain breaks precisely where democratic states need legal clarity.
That is the strength of Russian hybrid tactics. They create enough signals to force NATO to spend resources, but not enough certainty to trigger an immediate collective response. Moscow can deny involvement, while European governments must explain why they cannot say more.
The main failure is not that the drones appeared. In the world after Russia’s war in Ukraine, that is no longer surprising. The failure is that Western militaries did not capture or shoot down any of them. For an alliance accustomed to thinking in terms of fighter jets, missiles and strategic platforms, the small low-flying drone proved to be an inconvenient target.
European air defense was built for threats arriving from outside at high speed. A drone can fly slowly, low, briefly and almost from inside the perimeter. It may look like a bird, a small aircraft or noise in the data. That very simplicity makes it difficult for systems designed for a more “serious” war.
There is also the problem of the decision to engage. Over the sea or a training range, the choice is simpler. Over a base, port, airport or city, debris can fall on people, aircraft, fuel, ammunition or civilian infrastructure. A commander is handed not a technical decision, but a political one in real time.
That is likely part of the point. Russia is interested not only in the information a drone can collect, but in how the system behaves in response. Who detects the target first. Who has authority to give the order. Whether a helicopter is launched. Whether a laser is considered. Whether an airport is closed. Whether the public is informed. A drone may fly for hours, but its trace in procedures remains much longer.
The incidents in Denmark showed how quickly such a threat can move from the military sphere into civilian life. The closure of Copenhagen airport and other disruptions forced the country to speak of the most serious attack on critical infrastructure it had faced. No explosion, no declaration of war, no acknowledged attacker — but a real paralysis of part of the system.
Shadow fleet vessels were near Denmark at the time, including the Boracay. French forces later boarded the ship. The discovery of Russian nationals linked to a private military environment was an important detail: shadow tankers can no longer be understood only as tools for evading oil sanctions.
That means the fight against the shadow fleet must go beyond energy policy. Such vessels may be part of intelligence gathering, sabotage preparation, drone launches and the testing of maritime surveillance. A ship carrying oil, cargo or a false ownership story may also be a platform for a hybrid operation.
For NATO, this is an uncomfortable lesson. The alliance is used to measuring deterrence through large force: aircraft carriers, nuclear warheads, brigades and missile defense systems. Russia is showing that such force can be pressured by small tools — a drone, a cable, a ship with its signal switched off, an unidentified operator and a political pause in response.
Nuclear sites have a special role in this campaign. Surveillance over them does not necessarily mean preparation for an attack. Often it is enough to learn routes, response times, technical blind spots, security routines and how a government explains an incident to the public. In strategic warfare, information about protection can matter almost as much as protection itself.
European capitals are cautious about direct accusations, and that caution is understandable. Attribution in drone operations is difficult, especially when launches may come from the sea, through shadow structures and dual-use technology. But caution must not become paralysis. The repetition of incidents is already a signal.
Moscow denies conducting a sabotage campaign against Europe. But Russian strategy since 2022 has repeatedly relied on deniability. Do enough to create fear, cost and confusion, but leave space for the phrase “it was not us.” In hybrid warfare, that phrase is not a defense. It is part of the operation.
Europe’s response must be layered. It needs more than counter-drone systems around bases. It needs maritime control, a shared picture of air and coastal threats, rapid data exchange among allies, rules for the use of force, protection for airports and nuclear sites, and serious sanctions and law-enforcement action against the shadow fleet.
It also needs a different security culture. Police, civil aviation, navies, armies, intelligence agencies and government crisis centers must act as one system. If each sees only its own fragment, Russia wins in the spaces between institutions. A drone threat does not respect bureaucratic boundaries.
Ukraine’s experience is a warning here. What Europe sees as a new and awkward problem, Ukraine experiences every day in a far harsher form. Drones have become weapons of the front, terror, reconnaissance, logistics and psychological exhaustion. The European incidents are not a distant anomaly, but a softer version of the same war.
The worst mistake for NATO would be to treat these flights as minor violations. They are not minor if they occur over nuclear bases. They are not accidental if they recur across countries. They are not safe if they force states to reveal how they protect their most sensitive sites.
Drones over Europe’s nuclear infrastructure have not opened a front, but they have exposed a weak point. Russia is learning how to fight the alliance below the threshold of war, where every step is hard to prove but easy to feel. If Europe does not learn to respond as quickly as it detects the threat, the next test will be bolder, closer and more costly.
